($320k per km). This article recounts the decisions made at the official Indo-Nepal talks during the last seven years regarding that Cross-Border Interconnection and analyzes why Nepal has failed to attract national and international investors for its hydropower development.
Cross-border High Voltage Inter connections at Power Exchange Committee (PEC) and Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR)
It is necessary to chronicle how the two officials IndoNepal bodies, the Power Exchange Committee (PEC) and the Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR), perceived and dealt with that much-hailed MOU on cross-border high voltage interconnections. While India's PEC team is led by a Member (Power System) of the Central Electricity Authority (CEA) and an ex-officio Additional Secretary from the Government of India (GOI), the Nepalese team is led by NEA's Managing Director 9 . Similarly, while India's JCWR team is led by the GOI Water Resources Secretary, Nepal's Energy Secretary leads the joint Water Resources committee as the Water Resources Ministry has been conveniently dumped 8 .
a) At the Indo-Nepal CEA/NEA Level Power Exchange Committee (PEC)
At the 8th PEC meeting in June 2007 in Kathmandu, though there was no agenda on the four Cross-border Interconnections MOU, which had been concluded earlier that year. At that meeting, NEA's Managing Director 9 referred to the establishment of joint venture companies 'to put in place cross-border transmission links with a view to facilitate trading of power between the two countries on long term basis. ' The MOU of January 2007 stated that construction of interconnections would not only cater to the present supply and demand problem of Nepal but would also attract national and international investors to Nepal's hydropower development. Nepal hoped that these four interconnections would quicken the pace of hydropower development. The joint venture company was termed a special purpose vehicle (SPV). One is tempted to query about the merits of such SPVs over the standard practice of each country constructing transmission lines in its own territory to a mutually agreed point. One is not certain whether this SPV hands over its assets or not, like in Build Own and Transfer after expiry of the license.
At The PEC minutes mention India's open electricity market and that Nepal should take advantage of that open market for buying and selling bulk power. This is in theory only, however. In practice, India would choreograph her huge market in such a manner that it would be extremely difficult for non-Indian IPPs to get an access to that market. Consider the eight-year hassle that NEA is undergoing for establishing cross-border power trade Interconnections for a mere 150 MW over 25 years for import only. The length of terms is questionable.
Nepal's import of 150 MW power on a 'take or pay' basis (not dissimilar to Khimti and Bhotekoshi) for a 25 year period could have been justifiably negotiated over a shorter, say, 10 year period until a reservoir plant would be commissioned. Unfortunately, Nepal has given away her valuable base load of 150 MW to India for an unduly long 25 years. When the two IPPs, 60 MW Khimti and 36 MW Bhotekoshi, came online in early 2000, NEA's power plants had to back-down her generation (spill water) to accommodate the two IPPs' 'take or pay' condition.
At There are two important issues in the minutes of this 10th PEC meeting. One is Nepal's request to India for a second high capacity interconnection between Butwal and Gorakhpur. The 2007 January MOU had categorically stated that the Butwal-Gorakhpur interconnection was to go into construction 'immediately'. But as mentioned earlier, this Butwal-Gorakhpur interconnection was sidelined very early. The second important issue is the necessity for Nepal to apply to India's CTU, as per its regulations, for injecting power into the Indian grid. This is where the choreographing comes into play and this is why India is 'examining' the Draft MOU on Interconnection and Power Trading Agreement for two long years. 15 to increase the Indo-Nepal quantum of power exchange from 50 MW to 150 MW, she had no qualms about backtracking 16 by skillfully re-interpreting that power over 50 MW would be exchanged at the much higher 'commercial tariff rates'. Such skillful Indian (mis) interpretations have been a perennial problem for Indo-Nepal relations, be it on treaties, MOUs or other agreements. While the 200,000 MW strong India hesitates to increase its power capacity a mere 100 MW, the 33,000 MW strong Thailand boldly moves forward with 7,000 MW of power trade MOU with Laos. Now, take another case of the Four Border Project (India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan) initiated by the US-aided South Asia Regional Energy Initiative (SAREI) a decade ago. In the first phase, the Four Border Project envisaged cross-border power trading of only about 100 MW. This was essentially a confidence building measure to kick-start regional power trading. Though Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal were very keen, India, the kingpin linking all four borders, expressed disinterest bordering on displeasure. Despite being US-aided, the project met an untimely death. Likewise, for over two decades, much has been written, particularly in Nepal, on the utility and advantages of the SAARC grid, first proposed 30 years ago. But not a single decisive step has been made toward making the grand SAARC grid a reality. Another example is the meeting at the United Nations of landlocked countries clubbing together to demand 'third party transit access for electricity trading' like any other goods. Nepal was forced to back out of this group when the Indian delegate threatened 'unpleasant consequences' 17 if Nepal continued to demand this transit access.
b) At the Indo-Nepal Secretary Level Joint Committee on Water Resources (JCWR)
The above are flavors of how India has been choreographing, not only power trading and hydropower development of Nepal but, the entire spectrum of water resources development. Therefore, a strong lobby recommends that Nepal replicate India's model of hydropower development in Bhutan. This in essence translates to developers, consultants, contractors, equipments etc. all from India and India alone! On Nepal's present pathetic state in the power sector, Nepal's own academics 18 19 that has finally that 'the MOU would be examined and comments/ observations will be conveyed soon.' With load shedding increasing by leaps and bounds, even in the wet season, Nepal was naturally very keen to have this interconnections and Cross Border Power Trading Agreement finalized as early as possible. But India was in no hurry at all, taking time to carefully 'examine' the Agreement and promising to send the 'comments/observations… soon. ' At the 7th JCWR meeting of January 2013 held at Kathmandu, the Nepalese side 'brought to the notice of JCWR that despite sincere effort from both sides, the implementation of first 400 kV Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur Cross-border Transmission Line, which was meant to develop and operate in commercial mode, is taking longer time; and also that the capacity of line has already been exhausted even before implementation.' The Nepalese side, therefore, proposed 'a second crossborder line connecting Gorakhpur of India and a suitable location near Bardaghat of Nepal. ' The JCWR decided that the Nepalese side should prepare a concept paper and send it to the Indian side for review.
In desperation, at the 7th JCWR meeting of January 2013, Nepal finally minuted that the 400 kV DhalkebarMuzaffarpur Cross-border Transmission Line, despite the avowed commercial mode operation, is 'taking a longer time…. capacity of line has already been exhausted…' After a seven-year labour, Nepal finally displayed her frustration about the commercial mode operation of the Indo-Nepal special purpose vehicle and even conceded that the capacity of the 400 kV line had been exhausted! India, to the dismay of Nepal, merely brought to the notice of JCWR that 'the process would take little more time 13 in spite of continuous follow up because the proposed MOU is a new idea to the concerned agencies of Government of India. ' Diplomatically, India sent a message that Nepal's draft on the Cross Border Power Trading Agreement was being examined minutely. India could well afford to toy around with this proposed 'new idea', fully aware that Nepal, with increasing public pressure to mitigate load shedding, would be forced to concede to an agreement more palatable to India. Similarly, India skillfully forced delay on Nepal's second cross-border interconnection to Gorakhpur by asking Nepal for a concept paper. As of this writing, this is the current of the much-heralded January 2007 MOU on the four cross-border high voltage interconnections from the Indo-Nepal Secretary level JCWR meetings.
Final Word
Like Nepal, Laos is a land-locked hydropower rich country. Like India, Laos's next door neighbor, Thailand, is badly in need of hydropower. With growing global liberalization of power sector, Laos and Thailand signed an MOU in 1993 to trade 1,500 MW of crossborder power. This power trade MOU has now been arrived at the conclusion that if India does to Nepal what Thailand has done to Laos (sign the 7,000 MW umbrella power trade agreement) then practically all the constraints to Nepal's hydropower development will vanish. This single policy reform could result in a winwin situation for both countries. But some water pundits are quick to query: 'Is India really interested in Nepal's hydropower or her glacial-fed water?'
To conclude, the January 2007 MOU for the four cross-border high voltage interconnections with the Butwal-Gorakhpur and Duhabi-Purnea links going into 'immediate construction', has over the seven-year period has traveled a circuitous and cumbersome path. Surprisingly, the Butwal-Gorakhpur link to the northern grid and the Duhabi-Purnea link to the eastern grid were declined in favor of the single Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur link to the eastern grid. For reasons best known to the authorities, the NEA/IL&FS joint venture special purpose vehicle ballooned with two more public sector undertakings of India, Power Grid and Satluj Jalvidhyut Nigam. India's fourth public sector undertaking, Power Trading Corporation (PTC), is already in the Vehicle as the nodal agency with whom NEA has concluded the 150 MW power purchase agreement for 25 years. India has given the message that it wants its public sectors to lead and dictate the Indo-Nepal water resources development. India's emerging private sector has been, for the time being, sidelined as untouchable Dalits in this scramble for Nepal's water resources.
Again for reasons best known to the authorities, this 150 MW PPA was made the pre-condition for construction of the Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur interconnection. This interconnection has sadly become one-way import traffic, contrary to what the January 2007 MOU had envisaged as two-way cross-border import/export traffic. It is still very murky how this special purpose vehicle will function when the much anticipated India-export era begins. With Tata Projects Limited being awarded the 40 km Nepal portion of the Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur interconnection in December 2013, NEA authorities are optimistic that 150 MW of power from India will flow into the Nepalese grid starting June 2015. In fact, they are more worried about the timely construction of the 40 km Dhalkebar/ Nepal portion rather than the 100 km Muzaffarpur/ Indian portion. Ultimately, the proof of the pudding will, of course, be in the eating -that is, 
